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THE HIGH COURT REMAINS AS DIVIDED AS 
EVER OVER THE DEATH PENALTY 
George H. Kendall* †
More than three decades ago, in Furman v. Georgia, a sharply divided 
Supreme Court struck down all existing capital punishment schemes be-
cause the results they generated were arbitrary, discriminatory, and 
unreasoned. No member of that Court remains on the Court today, and the 
Court has grown increasingly conservative ever since. Nevertheless, impor-
tant questions concerning the administration of capital punishment continue 
to wrought deep divisions within the Court, for instance in determining 
whether racial bias influences the system, in determining the sufficiency of 
new evidence of innocence to justify review of a defaulted claim in habeas 
corpus proceedings, in determining a rule for addressing deadlocked pen-
alty-phase deliberations, and in determining the availability of a new rule 
concerning consideration of mitigating evidence on habeas review.  
During the past term, two new justices joined the Court in the same term 
for the first time since 1972, the year Furman was decided. The first capital 
case the Roberts Court addressed was Kansas v. Marsh. The issue presented 
was whether the Kansas legislature’s command that a death sentence should 
be imposed whenever the jury could not conclude that aggravating factors 
outweighed mitigating factors produced arbitrary rather than reasoned sen-
tences. If the outcome in Marsh is any indication of how the Court will deal 
with capital punishment in the future, it appears that the Roberts Court will 
divide as often and as sharply as did the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.  
I. 
When the Court granted certiorari to review the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kansas v. Marsh, no one predicted its eventual holding 
would shake the world. Kansas is a backwater in the capital punishment 
business: less than ten condemned inmates occupy death row there. The 
Kansas capital statute requires imposition of the death penalty whenever the 
jury cannot decide whether the state’s case for the death penalty outweighs 
the defendant’s case for a life sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court deter-
mined that this provision violates the Eighth Amendment because the statute 
“provides that in doubtful cases the jury must return a sentence of death” 
and a tie should not go to the executioner.  
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While the Marsh holding is narrow and its impact de minimus outside of 
Kansas, the opinions in Marsh are very significant in a number of respects. 
They show that the Roberts Court is as sharply divided over the administra-
tion of capital punishment as were the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The 
various opinions reveal wide differences on three significant fronts: (1) the 
Prior Supreme Court decisions have addressed the states’ power to struc-
ture the jury’s consideration of the sentencing evidence but did not address 
this issue specifically. Three 1990 decisions—each revealing a deeply-
divided Court—provide the most pertinent guidance. Pennsylvania’s capital 
statute mandates the death penalty when the aggravating circumstances, re-
gardless of their strength or quality, outweighed the mitigating evidence. A 
five justice majority held that this scheme satisfied the Eighth Amendment 
in Blystone v. Pennsylvania. California’s capital statute works similarly, re-
quiring the jury to impose the death penalty where aggravation outweighs 
mitigation. In Boyde v. California another 5–4 majority approved this 
scheme and rejected the view that the sentencer must remain free to reject 
the death penalty even where the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh 
the aggravating ones. Arizona’s capital statute is most similar to the Kansas 
law: it mandates the death penalty whenever the state has proven at least one 
aggravating circumstances, unless the mitigating evidence is sufficient to 
call for leniency. Over four dissents, the Court held that this scheme did not 
offend the Eighth Amendment in Walton v. Arizona. In each case, the major-
ity declared that the states enjoyed considerable discretion in choosing how 
aggravating and mitigating evidence was to be weighed by the sentencer.  
Before the Supreme Court, the State of Kansas argued that Walton, 
Boyde, and Blystone confirmed that the Kansas legislature had not erred in 
directing imposition of a death sentence when the jury was unable to decide 
if aggravation outweighed mitigation. But the Supreme Court soon found 
itself as divided as the Kansas Supreme Court, and as divided as it had been 
fifteen years earlier in Walton, Boyde, and Blystone.  
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion approved the Kansas statute, and 
claimed to break no new ground. His opinion asserts that “[t]his case is con-
trolled by Walton” because the Court therein rejected the argument that 
Arizona’s capital statute was unconstitutional “because the defendant ‘must 
. . . bear the risk of non-persuasion that any mitigating circumstance will not 
outweigh the aggravating circumstance.’ ” Moreover, even if Walton did not 
settle this question, Marsh concludes that the Eighth Amendment requires 
only that states (1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible offenders, 
and (2) permit the sentencer to “render a reasoned, individualized sentenc-
ing determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, personal 
characteristics, and the circumstances of the crime.” Because there is no 
question that the Kansas statute fulfills both requirements, there is no Eighth 
Amendment violation when the statute requires a capital sentence if the evi-
dence in aggravation and mitigation is at equipoise. 
II. 
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Court’s role in monitoring the administration of capital punishment, (2) its 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence concerning the states’ power to control 
the jury’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating evidence, and (3) the 
very integrity of the system that generates capital sentences. These are im-
portant questions that will not be resolved any time soon. 
A. When Should the Court Devote Itself To the  
Administration of Capital Punishment? 
It is in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissent-
ing opinion that the debate as to the Court’s role in reviewing capital cases is 
found. 
Justice Stevens argues that the Court never should have taken this case. 
No law required that the Court review the case, and the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s decision, even if wrong, was not binding upon any other state. Quot-
ing an earlier dissent in California v. Ramos, he asserts that “[n]othing more 
than an interest in facilitating the imposition of the death penalty in [Kan-
sas] justifies this Court’s exercise of discretion to review the judgment” 
below.  
Justice Stevens asserts that a decisive factor in determining whether to 
grant review is the “federal interest in ensuring that no person be convicted 
or sentenced in violation of the Federal Constitution – an interest entirely 
absent when the State is the petitioner.” Thus Justice Stevens suggests that 
the Court should ordinarily use its limited resources to review only those 
cases where the lower courts have misapplied the law in favor of a capital 
conviction or sentence. 
Justice Scalia forcefully disagrees. He argues that the Court possesses 
jurisdiction over state court adjudication of federal issues primarily “to en-
sure the integrity and uniformity of federal law.” Whenever a state high 
court has struck down state law on federal constitutional grounds, and has 
done so by misconstruing federal law, “review by this Court, far from un-
dermining state autonomy, is the only possible way to vindicate it.” 
Rejecting Justice Stevens’s view that the Court’s primarily responsibility is 
the vindication of a defendant’s federal constitutional rights, Justice Scalia 
posits that “[i]t is to ensure that when courts speak in the name of the Fed-
eral Constitution, they disregard none of its guarantees” for either the 
defendant or the State. 
In the future, how will the Court use its limited resources? Will it be 
primarily as Justice Stevens suggests–in cases where the lower courts have 
misapplied federal law to the detriment of an individual defendant, or as 
Justice Scalia prefers–to ensure the integrity and uniformity of federal law? 
If the Court’s current docket is any indication of a future trend, it appears, 
for the time being, that neither view has prevailed. Two of the four capital 
cases currently on the docket are grants of state petitions that claim lower 
courts misapplied federal law to the state’s detriment, and two are grants of 
petitioner applications. 
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B. Does the Eighth Amendment Require Only Narrowing  
& Consideration of Mitigation or Also A Process  
That Leads To Reasonably Reliable Results? 
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion and Justice Souter’s dissenting opin-
ion clearly sketch out very different views of the Eighth Amendment. In 
particular, the Justices sharply disagree on how the states may control the 
jury’s assessment of whether the facts justify society’s supreme sentence. 
Justice Thomas asserts that the Eighth Amendment imposes few re-
quirements that states must observe to utilize capital punishment, and 
otherwise leaves much of the sentencing procedure to the states. Reviewing 
the Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence, he identifies three rules in Marsh. 
First, the state must “rationally narrow the class of death-eligible” offenders. 
Second, the state must provide a sentencing proceeding, distinct from the 
guilt phase, where the defendant is free to introduce, and the jury is free to 
consider, evidence concerning the “defendant’s record, person characteris-
tics, and the circumstances of his crime.” Third, he concludes, “[s]o long as 
a state system satisfies these requirements, our precedents establish that a 
State enjoys a range of discretion in imposing the death penalty, including 
the manner in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances are to be 
weighed.” 
The Kansas statute thus presents no significant Eighth Amendment is-
sue, even though it requires the jury to impose the greater capital sentence 
when the state has failed to demonstrate that such a sentence is appropriate. 
In Justice Thomas’s view, this rule is permissible because “[i]t does not in-
terfere, in a constitutionally significant way, with a jury’s ability to give 
independent weight to evidence offered in mitigation.” 
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion charges that the Court’s precedents, 
while affording the states considerable discretion, nevertheless require a 
process that prohibits arbitrary results. He recalls that Furman struck down 
the former statutory schemes because those standardless systems “produced 
wanton and freakish results.” The Court upheld subsequent statutes because 
they possessed standards designed to produce reliable, rational, and ration-
ally reviewable death determinations. Thus, while the states possess “much 
leeway” in designing their sentencing schemes, a “system must meet an ul-
timate test of constitutional reliability” because the Eighth Amendment 
“demands both form and substance, both a system for decision and one 
geared to produce morally justifiable results.” 
Rejecting Kansas’s argument that Blystone, Boyde, and Walton confirm 
the Kansas statute’s constitutionality, Souter explains that the Eighth 
Amendment requires a state’s scheme to “inform the jury’s choice of sen-
tence with evidence about the crime as actually committed and about the 
specific individual who committed it.” Moreover, to ensure that only those 
whom the evidence plainly shows deserve death receive that sentence, 
Souter references Spaziano v. Florida and declares that “the essence of the 
sentencing authority’s responsibility is to determine whether the response to 
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the crime and defendant ‘must be death.’ ” The Kansas statute plainly does 
not pass muster because: 
The dispositive fact under the tie breaker is not the details of the crime or 
the unique identity of the individual defendant. The determining fact is not 
directly linked to a particular crime or particular criminal at all; the law 
operates merely on a jury’s finding of equipoise in the State’s own selected 
considerations for and against death. Nor does the tie breaker identify the 
worst of the worst, or even purport to reflect any evidentiary showing that 
death must be the reasoned moral response; it does the opposite. The stat-
ute produces a death sentence exactly when a sentencing impasse 
demonstrates as a matter of law that the jury does not see the evidence as 
showing the worst sort of crime committed by the worst sort of criminal, in 
a combination heinous enough to demand death. 
This law, Souter submits, is “morally absurd” because it requires execu-
tion when the case for aggravation “has failed to convince the sentencing 
jury” that death is the proper sentence.  
These opinions stake out vastly different views as to what the Eighth 
Amendment requires of the states. The majority is satisfied so long as two 
procedural protections are in place: the class of eligible offenders is ade-
quately narrowed and the sentencer is permitted to consider a defendant’s 
background and character. The four dissenters believe these procedural ele-
ments are necessary but not sufficient: the states’ schemes cannot require a 
death sentence when the prosecution fails to show that the facts mandate it. 
C. Does the Growing Number of Exonerations Demonstrate Our  
System Is Too Fallible to Reliably Impose Death  
Only on The Worst of the Worst? 
Justice Souter’s dissent and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion vigor-
ously engage the issue of the fallibility of the system, and the lessons to be 
drawn from the growing number of exonerations. On this point, their views 
could not disagree more. 
Justice Souter did not put his pen down after he declared that the major-
ity’s approval of the Kansas statute “defies decades of precedent aimed at 
eliminating freakish capital sentencing.” In four concluding paragraphs, he 
raises an even more fundamental concern. He explains that the Court con-
fronts circumstances much like those that presented themselves to the 
Furman Court. The Furman decision, he submits, was a “response to facts 
that could not be ignored, the kaleidoscope of the life and death verdicts that 
made no sense in fact or morality.” 
There is a new body of facts, Justice Souter asserts, that “must be ac-
counted for in deciding what, in practical terms, the Eighth Amendment 
guarantees should tolerate.” They are the circumstances found in the exon-
erations “of convicts under death sentence, in numbers never imagined 
before the development of DNA tests.” Justice Souter notes that in 2000, in 
Illinois alone the state exonerated more inmates than it executed. Other 
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reputable studies show that more than 100 inmates condemned in the 
post-Furman era have since been exonerated. These studies further demon-
strate many of the “wrongful convictions and sentences resulted from 
eyewitness misidentification, false confession, and (most frequently) per-
jury.” All of this leads Justice Souter to quote Gregg v. Georgia in declaring 
“[w]e are thus in a period of new empirical argument about how ‘death is 
different.’ ”  
Justice Scalia could not disagree more. He charges that the facts do not 
support Justice Souter’s view that many innocents are being condemned to 
death. He notes that the dissent points to no case in which an executed pris-
oner has been exonerated. He examines several scholarly articles that assert 
that during the 20th century more than twenty executed prisoners were very 
likely innocent, but argues that the conclusions are unverified and that the 
most recent case dates from 1984. Looking at the lists of more current exon-
erations, Justice Scalia asserts that they vastly over-represent the number of 
truly innocent persons who were wrongly convicted. And because in each of 
those cases the system either cleared the individual or overturned the con-
viction, Justice Scalia argues these events are solid proof that the legal 
system is sufficiently reliable to identify and correct such error. 
Thus, Justice Scalia declares, while our system is not perfect, the likeli-
hood of executing an innocent person “has been reduced to an insignificant 
minimum.” Because the American people have determined that the benefits 
of capital punishment outweigh the risk of error, it is not the “proper part of 
the business of th[e] Court . . . to second guess that judgment.” 
This final debate is truly significant. Justice Souter’s assessment of the 
lessons learned from the exoneration cases is that our system of justice gen-
erally, and the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence specifically, is far from 
adequate to protect the innocent and to assure reasoned and reliable capital 
sentences. Like Justice Goldberg’s dissent from denial of certiorari in Ru-
dolph v. Alabama, which asked whether the death penalty was excessive 
punishment for crimes that did not result in the victim’s death, and which 
spawned the road to Furman, one has to wonder what the Court will do with 
arguments in the future that assert new constitutional rules are necessary to 
assure that the innocent, and those who do not deserve the death penalty, are 
adequately protected. 
The rule of Marsh will have little impact upon our nation’s use of the 
death penalty. But the strong debate that runs throughout its opinions reveals 
a Court that disagrees sharply over some of the most fundamental questions 
that arise in its role in the administration of capital punishment. 
